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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

JULY, 1918

IS POLITICS ADJOURNED?

WILL NOT THE PRESIDENT MAKE IT SO?

BY THE EDITOR

"POLITICS," said the President to the Congress in a tone of conviction, "is adjourned." We wish it were; but is it?

"The elections," continued the President, "will go to those who think least of it; to those who go to their constituencies without explanations or excuses, with a plain record of duty faithfully and disinterestedly performed." We hope so; but do the Representatives looking for return to Washington act as if they thought so? Why are they so loath, almost to the point of rebellion, to remain at their posts while a revenue bill is being drawn and considered? Why are they planning a recess for all except the perturbed members of the Ways and Means Committee? Why are so many absent from time to time even now? Can it be that they are less "confident" than the President declares himself to be, "that the people will give a just verdict upon the service of the men who act for them, when the facts are such that no man can disguise or conceal them"? May it not be that they scent danger in the "intense and pitiless light" that beats upon them and that they feel a pressing need of making "explanation," if not indeed "excuses" to their constituents?

That politics *should* be adjourned in this hour of the Nation's peril we grant. While we do not claim to have originated the suggestion, we advanced it and have pleaded publicly and privately for its adoption and, as the readers of this REVIEW have been made aware possibly to the verge of

boredom, have reiterated persistently the plain reasons why at this time as never before considerations of patriotism and unity should transcend all others, even to the exclusion of all others, in the public mind. And we know from countless expressions of approval from all sections that the country coincides. The Boston *Transcript* speaks no less truly than appealingly and eloquently when it says of the President's declaration:

Here we see and hear and are heartened by "the President at his best"—speaking straightforwardly the thought and feeling of the people to whom the war is coming closer home with every passing day. They have no time for politics, and professional politicians put them out of temper. With the people the winning of the war is the first thing that counts and the only thing that counts. No burden is too heavy for them to bear, no sacrifice too hard for them to make, no sorrow, no suffering, beyond their endurance, provided only that the burden and the sacrifice, the sorrow and the suffering will help to win the war, and soon the world will know that the least among these offerings for the great cause is that which has come and will continue to come out of the pockets of the rich and the poor, the naturalized and the native born. The loss of treasure in the final accounting will appear small in comparison with that other loss for which neither time nor treasure can compensate, but only the glory of a great grief greatly borne.

And the spirit of party now bars in no small measure the realization of this noble aspiration,—that same "envenomed, relentless and unpatriotic spirit of party," which, as Gideon Welles wrote upon like occasion in 1862, "paralyzes and weakens the hand of the Government and the country." Why is this so? Where lies the blame?

I. THE REPUBLICAN ATTITUDE

If the Republicans were to be judged by the utterance of their venerable leader in the Senate, Mr. Gallinger, theirs would be a sorry showing. Speaking, for example, of the proposal to eliminate partisanship, so far as possible, from the forthcoming Congressional election, he remarked in his most finely satirical vein:

There are other arrangements which we would be pleased to make. If the Democrats will present no candidate for the Senate in Illinois, we will refrain from a contest in Mississippi; if they will keep out of the contest in New Hampshire, we will abstain from conflict in Texas; if they will observe a political truce in New Jersey, we

will observe one in Georgia. We are wholly willing and even desirous of showing our patriotism and the absence of partisanship from our minds in exactly the same measure and in the same manner as that which the Democrats have displayed. I hope we may soon be able to take up the *pour parlers* to this end. By all means "Let us Have Peace."

Flippancy of this kind may be excused, perhaps, as becoming sufficiently well a Bourbon who long ago reached the age of indiscretion, but light remarks of similar nature so frequently tossed off by Senator Penrose, who is at the height of his mental powers, are less easily pardoned. It is but fair, however, to record that the irritating attitude of these two incorrigibles differs radically from that of any other of their Republican colleagues. As might have been expected of a true statesman, however strongly partisan in ordinary times, Senator Lodge, the real leader of the Senate, ran true from the beginning,—so clearly true, indeed, that both of the bodies comprising the General Court of Massachusetts, Democrats and Republicans alike, gave to him a vote of confidence with substantial unanimity.

"It was not only what you said, but the way you said it," he gratefully acknowledged to the House later. "There were no party lines in it. This is no time for party lines. Since the beginning of the war I have cast no party vote and do not intend to do so while the war continues." Subsequently, speaking as a member of the Naval Affairs Committee, he paid a handsome and well-deserved tribute to Secretary Daniels, whose meddlesome flounderings previous to the war had not won the full approbation of himself or of some others who need not now be mentioned.

Senator Weeks spoke in like strain and was so well received that we hear in a roundabout way that Governor McCall is not likely to interpose his candidacy in the Republican primaries. True, both Senators pledged their best efforts to root out "mismanagement and inefficiency wherever found," but it would ill become us to object to that.

It is worthy of remark, too, that the minority leader of the House shines by comparison with Senator Gallinger. Administration organs made so much of fragmentary reports of his speech to the Republican Club in New York that we read it in completed form and feel bound to testify to the rightfulness of its spirit and its fairness in all respects. After saying at the outset that he had tried, and he believed

successfully, not even to think along partisan lines, he declared that never before in his twenty-five years of service had partisanship been so obliterated and legislation run so smoothly. Of the committee charged with appropriating nine billions of dollars, he said:

The majority of this sub-committee was of course Democratic, because the Democrats are in the majority in this Congress and the party in power always controls and has a majority upon every one of the committees. The two Republicans on this sub-committee were Mr. Cannon, of Illinois, and myself, and I suppose it has sometimes been thought of both of us that we were not entirely devoid of partisanship, but I am happy to say that in all the deliberations of that committee and in all the contests which occurred there—and there were often points of difference which were strenuously contested—there was never the slightest suggestion of partisan division.

I think both the majority and the minority were constantly actuated by the same desire to give the Administration every dollar of money which we thought it could wisely use, and I do not believe anybody who had listened to the discussions or recorded the votes in that committee could have guessed who were the Democrats and who were the Republicans. I am happy to say the Democratic majority treated us in the minority with just as much consideration and respect as if we were of their party, and all the deliberations were carried on, as far as partisanship went, with the most perfect harmony.

Surely no handsomer tribute than that could be asked by anybody. True, Mr. Gillett deprecated, as well he might, the Administration's backward movement on civil service reform and disapproved of sending unofficial or unknown representatives abroad while our Allies were sending to us their most competent and best known, but even we, in the process of friendly and somewhat persistently constructive criticism, have gone as far as that. In point of fact, all that we could find in Mr. Gillett's speech that might offend the most sensitive spirit was the following:

Inasmuch as Republicans have been quite as loyal and earnest and hearty in their support of the Administration on all war measures and have not hesitated to grant unheard of powers, both in money and in possession of property and in control over the acts and business of the citizens, it seemed to me that in return there should have been given to Congress the fullest information as to how these great powers were exercised, and that all departments of the Administration would be overscrupulous in putting before a friendly Congress the full facts of their administration, but I regret to say that spirit has not always been visible. I fear that there has been a studied effort to disclose to Congress and the public only the favorable side and conceal discour-

aging facts. We have not been allowed to know how far below expectation our assistance to the Allies has been, and now as the facts are leaking out there is deep disappointment and suspicion.

Which is true as gospel. Mr. Gillett concluded gallantly:

However, my friends, although the partisanship exhibited by the Administration is not agreeable to us, yet it is not going to diminish our support. It may take from it something of cordiality and heartiness, but it will not take from it anything of force or efficiency. The Republican Party in Congress in the future, as in the past, intends to prove that its one purpose, in which it is engaged heart and soul, is to give to the Administration everything possible to make it more forceful and more successful; not to criticize, not to complain, but ignoring all sectional or partisan feelings to vie with the men from the South and West and the North who differ from us in political faith in supporting the Executive until this terrible scourge of war is over.

These are good words; and they not only ring true, but are borne out by the record of Republican voting. Upon all of the war propositions combined the Republican vote in the Senate has been 76 per cent plus against 75 per cent minus Democratic, while in the House 169 Republicans voted for and 42 against the President's selective-draft measure, as contrasted with 144 Democratic ayes and 67 Democratic noes, and later 164 Republicans voted for and only 14 against the essential modification urged by the President, as contrasted with 79 Democratic ayes and 118 Democratic noes.

Clearly no fair mind can fail to give to the Republicans of Congress a clean bill of patriotism in upholding the President to the full and in putting aside all partisan considerations.

And best of all is the bugle call from Elihu Root, Republican of Republicans but also patriots, delivered amid tumultuous cheers to the National Security League and reported in this wise by the newspapers:

We are going to elect a Congress this coming fall. There is one great single predominant qualification for an election to that Congress, and that is a loyal heart. (Applause.)

I don't care whether a man is a Democrat or a Republican or a Progressive or a Socialist or a Prohibitionist, or what not, he must have a loyal heart, or it is treason to send him to Congress. (Applause.) There are probably from twenty to thirty Congressional districts in this country where there is a loyal majority but where there is so large a disloyal minority that a division of the loyal majority may let a pro-German in. In every one of those districts, Democrats and Republicans and all loyal men should get together and agree upon the loyal man of one party or the other who is the surest

to carry the district, and all unite on him without regard to party. (Applause.)

Any man who would not accept the idea and follow it I would want to live a hundred years to vote and work against. (Applause.) Human nature has not changed. There are going to be parties, going to be politics hereafter; but now they are subordinate, they are unimportant. The one thing only is to win the war and put men in Congress who will represent the driving power of the American people; the driving power that is behind Congress, that is behind the Administration, and that, God grant, may make itself felt behind the men who are puttering over contracts and lingering on the road to victory. (Applause.)

The great thing is to make Germany feel that the hundred millions of America are going, as one man, to beat them (applause), to make every American feel that all the rest of the hundred millions are with him in his mightiest efforts to beat the German. (Applause.)

A noble and inspiring utterance, worthy of Patrick Henry, from the foremost living statesman in the world.

II. THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

"In this critical situation," said Secretary McAdoo in New Orleans, "we cannot think of or play cheap partisan politics, which is practiced too much, I am sorry to say, in America, and which even a great war does not wholly silence. That is the kind of politics we cannot for one moment permit to raise its head in this perilous time. I have infinite contempt for those who would take advantage of the situation in which our country finds itself to-day to advance any personal interest or ambition—public or private."

The effect of this admirable declaration, we regret to say, was marred somewhat by his subsequent statement in Texas that "as for 1920, in my judgment, there is only one man in America,"—meaning, of course, Mr. Wilson,—"who deserves the gift of that exalted office [the Presidency] from the American people"; but this may be readily overlooked as merely a filial, though ill-timed, tribute voiced in a moment of enthusiasm.

Speaker Clark's frankly partisan speech in Indiana, in which he appealed to "the grand inquest of the Nation" for approval of the Democratic record, "a magnificent, a wonderful record which anybody save a stark idiot can easily and successfully defend," may be regarded as an offset to Senator Gallinger's sneer, even though the *World* did administer a sharp rebuke to him for going so far at this particular time.

It is really the President himself who has the most difficult task in making his words square with his deeds respecting the injection of partisan strife into the forthcoming elections. It was not surprising that Senator Lewis, in the recent Senatorial campaign in Wisconsin, should have urged the election of Mr. Davies upon the ground that the return of a Democrat and a "personal friend of the President" was requisite to "the saving of the Nation"; that was to have been expected. Neither were the rankly partisan tirades of the Vice-President so unusual as to evoke particular emotion; after all, he is from Indiana. But when the President himself took typewriter in hand and drew a sharp line between Democratic patriotism and Republican disloyalty as embodied in the respective candidates, he certainly dazed though, judging from the result, hardly hypnotized those independent voters who still hold consistency and straightforwardness to be cardinal virtues. To Mr. Davies he wrote:

May I also add a word of thanks to you for your steadfast loyalty and patriotism during that trying period before we were thrust into the war, while to avoid becoming involved therein every effort was being made aggressively to assert and fearlessly to maintain American rights?

Frankly confessing, in the absence of plans and specifications, our utter inability to resolve into logical relationship the purpose and method thus set forth, we regard it as certain that the President meant to convey to the people the impression that the election of Mr. Davies would meet with his approbation.

On the other hand, aiming straight at Mr. Lenroot, he added:

The McLemore resolution, the embargo issue, and the armed neutrality measure presented the first opportunities to apply the acid test in our country to disclose true loyalty and genuine Americanism. It should always be a source of much satisfaction to you that on these crucial propositions you proved true.

Obviously, since Mr. Davies was not a member of Congress, the President must have spoken from personal knowledge, but that is neither here nor there; we have no doubt that his diagnosis of his friend's sentiments was correct. In any case, the issue was defined with almost startling clearness; the "acid test to disclose true loyalty and genuine Americanism" was the record of a candidate on the "crucial propositions" enumerated. But it was not retroactive. It

did not apply, for example, to Representative Kent of California, who, after having voted against tabling the McLemore resolution, and after having been defeated for re-election, was appointed a member of the Tariff Commission. Nor do we recall that, in the election of 1916, the President by so much as a hint or suggestion opposed the return of 20 Democratic Congressmen, including the famous McLemore himself, all of whom voted as Mr. Lenroot voted and failed equally in meeting "the acid test" of "true loyalty and genuine Americanism."

We have not the remotest idea that Mr. Wilson ever countenanced or heard of the appeal to the soldiers in Camp Grant published in a Rockford newspaper in these ringing words:

Tuesday, April 2, you are entitled to vote for United States Senator from Wisconsin to succeed Senator Paul O. Husting. President Wilson, your Commander in Chief, desires all loyal Americans to vote for Joseph E. Davies for United States Senator.

Davies's election means joy at Washington and gloom at Berlin. Davies's defeat means gloom at Washington and joy at Berlin.

That sounds more like Creel. In any event, 576 soldiers voted for Mr. Lenroot to 403 for Mr. Davies and, as everybody knows, Mr. Lenroot carried the State by a handsome majority.

It is but natural, in the circumstances, that even the great body of Republicans who, in common we believe with the great body of Democrats, deplore partisan strife at this crucial time, should feel that the President means to apply his "acid test" exclusively to Republicans; but we do not concur in that view. We are disposed to believe (1) that his alert mind drew a salutary lesson from the result in Wisconsin, (2) that he has seen a great light in the death struggle and crying need of all that United America can give in France, and (3) that when he declares to the Congress and the people "Politics is adjourned," he means precisely what he says.

In that belief we seek his help.

III. PATRIOTISM BEFORE POLITICS

The readers of this REVIEW, as we remarked at the outset, are cognizant of our endeavors to eliminate partisan strife from the forthcoming Congressional elections and are familiar with our reasons for believing that it can be done to a

very considerable degree, through patriotic co-operation, to enormous advantage of the country and without prejudice or disadvantage to either of the great parties. In pursuance of this object, on May 13 we addressed to the Chairmen of the two National Committees identical notes to this effect:

WASHINGTON, Monday, May 13.

My DEAR MR. HAYS:

In consideration of the unprecedented condition of public affairs and of a quite common desire, so far as may be practicable, to eliminate partisanship from the coming Congressional elections, might it not be possible—even probable—for you and Mr. McCormick to reach an agreement, upon wholly patriotic grounds, to eliminate from political strife a certain number of districts in which the results cannot in candor be regarded as in the slightest degree doubtful? Take as bald instances, for example, Vermont and Arkansas—indeed, while I have not carefully analyzed the situation, I am disposed to think that fully 50 and perhaps 60 per cent. of the Congressional districts would fall within the classification of “certainty.” Now, if I am right, or even approximately correct in this assumption, would it not be worth while at least for you and Mr. McCormick to meet, simply to talk the matter over and see if something along the line I have suggested may not be accomplished to the advantage of the country and the cause?

I appreciate, of course, that nothing at this late day could be achieved further than a mutual agreement upon the part of you two Chairmen to recommend to your respective electors in such districts as may be regarded as *certain* to vote this or that way not to interpose an opposing candidate—unless, of course, the one named by the recognized majority should be objectionable upon grounds of suspected disloyalty or for some other distinctive reason.

I hesitate, naturally, to address you upon such a matter, and am impelled to do so, I beg you to believe, only by the positiveness of the expressed convictions of many others, no less than of my own, that anything, however seemingly unimportant, that might be done to evidence to our friends abroad a unity of spirit and purpose at home, could not fail to be advantageous.

I cannot see how any harm or bother, political or otherwise, could eventuate from an informal and of course wholly uncommitting conversation such as I have suggested, and I can perceive at least a possibility of great good.

Also, it goes without saying, I may be quite in error, with respect at any rate to practicability, but, feeling as I do, I cannot do less than take the risk of seeming to be so presumptuous as to propose that I try to arrange such a meeting as I have suggested. Simultaneously with the despatch of this note to you, I am of course sending one identical in every respect to Mr. McCormick. And I remain,

Faithfully yours,

GEORGE HARVEY.

WILL H. HAYS, ESQ.,
Chairman of the Republican
National Committee.

Mr. Hays responded on the same day as follows:

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HARVEY:

I have your note, and I like the idea. Anything I can do to keep politics out of this war I stand ready to do.

While, of course, as you point out, we cannot go past a certain point, I believe that something to this end might be achieved by a discussion of your suggestion, and with that purpose in mind, I will gladly keep any appointment that may be convenient to you and Mr. McCormick.

Sincerely yours,

WILL H. HAYS.

Another thing occurs to me, and doubtless has to you—that our meeting in this way might make more surely effective our determination to whack any disloyal head that may show up.

W. H. H.

Four days later Mr. McCormick replied to an identical note as follows:

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1918.

DEAR COL. HARVEY:

I want to acknowledge your kind letter of the 13th.

The matter about which you have written me has been brought to my attention before, and I have already given very careful consideration to this subject which I consider of very great importance. I want to assure you that the suggestions you have made will have my most careful consideration, and I thank you for writing me.

Faithfully yours,

VANCE C. McCORMICK,
Chairman.

There the matter stands. The prompt response of Mr. Hays is undeniably frank, unequivocal and, to our mind, worthy of the highest commendation. Less could hardly be said in fairness, but in saying it we are far from meaning to imply the slightest reflection upon Mr. McCormick. His is a grave responsibility calling for the exercise of exceptional prudence, especially with regard to a matter which he regards rightfully as of so great importance. Nevertheless, at the expiration of five weeks after the submission of a suggestion to which he had already given careful consideration, we feel warranted in making a direct appeal to the leader of the Democratic party,—to the only man who can meet the country's demand and resolve into accomplishment his own dictum that Politics shall be, as it ought to be, Adjourned.

Our letter to the two Chairmen presents the case as clearly as we can state it, but the wider possibilities of crushing disloyalty, wherever it may raise its ugly head, now or

hereafter, through the patriotic coöperation which would inevitably ensue from adoption of the plan proposed are illimitable.

We have only to add, as an indication of the far-reaching effect and practicability of the idea, that if 3,000 majority in each of the last two elections should be accepted, except of course in special instances, as marking a district as safe for the party which carried it both times, the number of Congressional elections would be reduced from 435 to less than 100 and probably, by supplementary mutual agreement, to not more than seventy-five.

“Politics is adjourned.”

Will not the President make it so?

AN ECONOMIC ALLIANCE

WHEN nations are at war with each other they are, or should be, at war “all over.” That is to say, they fight each other not at one point alone, but wherever they come into contact; and they fight not alone with armies and navies but also with all the forces of diplomacy, of industry and of commerce. Laws prohibiting under penalty trading, correspondence or friendly intercourse of any kind with enemies are customary and appropriate.

Conversely, it is logical and we should say essential that when nations are allied, at any rate when they are allied in such a war as this, they should similarly be allied “all over.” That is to say, they should not merely coöperate against the common foe with their armies and navies; but they should equally coördinate and combine their diplomatic activities and their industries and commerce, and these latter should be used no less than their military equipments, not separately but unitedly, for the purpose of overcoming the foe and securing and confirming the objects of the war.

Accepting these observations academically, as little less than axiomatic, we shall now do well to apply them in the most practical and efficient manner to the accomplishment of the gigantic task which we and our Allies have in hand. We and they—all the Allied Powers—are already in military accord, with our armies consolidated under a single Generalissimo. It is further proposed, most happily, to “pool” all Allied war resources of munitions, food and raw materials,

under either a single head or, more probably, an Allied Cabinet of War Supplies. That will be a perfectly logical sequence to the appointment of a Generalissimo for the Allied armies. But we cannot reckon even it as a finality. There are other steps to be taken for the full completion of what we may call the Alliance of Civilization.

There may be some question as to the extent to which it would be practicable, under the hard and fast prescriptions of the American Constitution, to place the functions of diplomacy and economic administration under a single international head. We can perceive difficulties which might prove insurmountable. But international accord does not imply abdication of national sovereignty. What is obvious and certain is that there could and should be at least a community of counsels, and a consequent unity of purpose, policy and action. That is why it has seemed to us regrettable that the United States should so long have persisted in differing from and holding aloof from all its Allies in Russian policy. While all the nations which are in closest touch with Russia and are therefore supposedly best informed concerning her have been in favor of aiding her with deeds as well as with rhetoric, the United States has alone held back, dissented, and thus blocked action; leaving the unhappy wreck of a once great empire to drift to dissolution and to absorption by the Huns. There is abundant reason for believing that tactful but vigorous action months ago, as dictated by "the common sense of most," would have saved Russia from being partitioned, would have rehabilitated her as a sovereign entity, and would have brought her back into the war as an effective democratic force coöperating with the other democracies of the world against the menace of autocracy.

This unity of allied effort is so desirable as a war measure as to be all but indispensable. But we cannot regard it as by any means confined in its desirability and utility to the period of actual belligerence. It will be equally pertinent to the making of peace, and thereafter for an indeterminate period to the maintenance of peace. We must assume with all confidence that when this war ends we are not merely going to stop fighting and then wash our hands of all further responsibility for the welfare of the world. To do so would be both imbecile and criminal. It will be incumbent upon the Allies not merely to win the war but also and equally to secure and to conserve its results. That will mean that they

must adopt such measures of reorganized relationships among all nations as will afford the fullest possible compensation for the losses of the war and also afford the strongest possible guarantee against another such war if not against any international war. In such measures it is obvious that economic provisions must play an important part.

There is thus talk about certain degrees of non-intercourse with Germany after the war. Private initiative has led to the signing by millions of pledges not to purchase goods of any kind of German origin for a long term of years following the war. Going further, it is seriously proposed that governmental action shall be taken for the prohibition or at least the discouragement of commercial dealings with Germany, in either buying or selling. In part these proposals doubtless arise, consciously or unconsciously, from a natural and perfectly legitimate feeling of resentment and hatred toward Germany for her attack upon civilization and her unspeakable barbarities in the war. It is indeed difficult to understand how anyone could hereafter purchase, let us say, children's toys from Nuremberg, with a memory of the manner in which Germans have been torturing and massacring little children in France and Belgium; or how any woman could purchase or use any article of German origin, remembering the outrage and martyrdom that thousands of women have suffered at German hands.

But these proposals arise, also, from other considerations than these. It is cogently argued that, on the most practical grounds of equity, the Allies should have the first opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and to restore their own industries and commerce; and that they should give to each other, and afterward to friendly neutrals, the preference over the Huns in both imports and exports. Nor is that all. It is felt that it would be foolishly imprudent to give Germany an opportunity of speedy commercial rehabilitation and therefore of ability again to make herself the troubler of the world. In this there is none of the wanton malignancy with which Germany proposed to "bleed France white," and with which she has during the present war been destroying the industries and also destroying so far as possible the effective manhood of conquered regions. It is simply felt that Germany has grossly misused her material prosperity. She has in the last half century made marvellous industrial and commercial progress, in which she has been greatly aided

by the friendly patronage of the world at large; and she has now prostituted all the results of that progress to the vilest of purposes, namely, the conquest of the nations which have befriended her, and the subversion of the free and humane civilization of the world to the savage despotism of the hateful thing which she calls "Kultur." After such misuse it would be unreasonable to expect the world to give her another opportunity for a repetition of the same misuse. It would be entirely reasonable and equitable for the world to insist, and to decree through the common agreement and action of civilized Powers, that until through the slow processes of time the German people shall have become chastened and civilized, so that they will no longer turn the resources of civilization against civilization itself, they shall be barred from the normal commercial and social intercourse of nations.

The possibility that such action will be taken is said to cause much concern in Germany, and on the strength of reports to that effect some men in this country are speculating upon the practicability of using threats to that effect as a means of compelling Germany to sue for peace. It has even been intimated that the threat of commercial discrimination against her will be used as a club, and that an offer to refrain from such discrimination will be used as a bribe, to prevail upon Germany to stop the war. Of which speculations, intimations and what not, we must entirely and most earnestly disapprove.

We should of course not object to Germany's being frightened into suing for peace by the prospect of commercial outlawry. We should heartily rejoice thereat. But we can conceive nothing more foolish than it would be to depend upon or in any degree to look to any such thing as a means of ending the war. Germany may be frightened; or she may be merely pretending to be frightened so as to delude us into relaxing our war efforts and into being willing to enter another Brest-Litovsk conference and let the Jeremy Diddlers of Berlin dupe us as they duped the Bolsheviki. Her fright is nothing to us. It should not, even if it were indubitably genuine, induce us for one moment to relax our aggressiveness against her by so much as the hundred millionth part of a degree. On the contrary, if we knew that the reports were true and that the whole German nation was mortally frightened at the forecast of what may happen to them after the war, we should say that that was one of the strongest

reasons for pressing on the more remorselessly and inexorably, to kill Huns with all our might and main. Panic-stricken men are the easiest of all to slaughter, and our chief duty before God and man is to KILL HUNS.

It would be a foolish and indeed a most discreditable thing to propose a commercial "boycott" as a means of exerting pressure for peace upon Germany, and it would be nothing short of infamous to offer resumption and maintenance of economic equality as a bribe for quitting the war. All the reasons for treating Germany as a commercial outlaw exist now, in full force, and they would not be destroyed nor diminished in power by the mere making of peace. It will not matter whether the war is ended by the unconditional surrender of Germany, or by our fighting her to a standstill and crushing her to her knees. The economic alliance against her must be effective in either case. It will be a feature of the peace, just as the military alliance is a feature of the war.

We must indeed regard it as quite futile to expect any apprehension or fear which Germany may suffer to have a chastening effect upon her or to cause her to surrender her arms. It is possible that the fear or the risk of suffering economic outlawry might have had a deterrent effect before the war, if it had been clearly presented to some German minds. At any rate, it would have been taken into consideration, as one of the potential contingencies of the war, and as one of the penalties which might be incurred in case of defeat. We do not say that it would have proved or could have been made to prove effectively deterrent. We think not.

The question of generosity may also be dismissed. It is not pertinent. Generosity is not to be taken into consideration in dealing with the nation which in 1870 deliberately, through lies and forgery, provoked a war with France for the premeditated purpose of robbing her of her coal and iron mines and "bleeding her white" by the exaction of an indemnity which it was thought would be beyond her power to pay; with the nation which for forty-odd years thereafter was the most arrogant, ungenerous and dishonest of all in the world in its commercial transactions; with the nation which in this war has conducted such an orgy of public and private loot, and of such wanton and wholesale destruction of the economic resources and peaceful industries of other lands, as the world never before witnessed. It is not harsh,

it is not ungenerous, to make the plunderer disgorge his plunder, or to make the wanton marauder pay some penalty for his crimes.

Nor can we for a moment admit the objection of illegality, under the principles of international law which Germany herself repudiates but which are still cherished and revered by the civilized nations of the world. Law is partly a matter of equity, and partly of precedent. With the equitable view we have already concerned ourselves. Upon that ground our title to the proposed policy is clear and indefeasible. Upon that of precedent, even of precedent sanctioned by Germany herself, it is no less strong. From time immemorial civilized nations have maintained and have practised the right to control, for the general good, the affairs of those which are their inferiors in morals and civilization. Thus traffic in firearms and intoxicants with African tribes has been prohibited; the slave trade has been interfered with; international supervision was established over the chaotic finances of Turkey; the tariff laws of China have for many years been subject to foreign dictation. These and other similar things have been participated in by Germany, and have received the sanction of undisputed precedent. Who shall challenge the right of the world—nay, the imperative duty of the civilized Powers of the world—to apply at least some small measure of the same principle to a nation which has shown itself more lawless, more barbaric, more unfit to exercise the prerogatives of national sovereignty and the international peerage, than any African tribe or Oriental horde?

THE NEW FOURTH OF JULY

It is not a customary thing for the President to issue a proclamation or any public utterance concerning the Fourth of July. For several generations that anniversary has been so well established a date in the patriotic calendar as to need no reminder and no exhortation for its general and befitting observance. At the present time, however, we must be grateful to the President for what he recently said concerning it, by way of calling attention not to the day itself nor yet to its long-prevalent and conventional significance, but rather to some certain new significations and new duties which have been given to it by the extraordinary events of the last year.

Perhaps these significations and duties are not altogether new. Indeed, we must regard them as having existed from the beginning. But they have been latent, or have been ignored, and it has required the tremendous stress of our implication in the world war to reveal them to us and to emphasize upon our minds their transcendent importance.

There is first of all, perhaps, the eternal union between power and responsibility, between right and duty. For nearly a century and a half we have been recognizing, boasting, glorifying and practising our independence. That has been right and fitting and commendable. But the trouble has been that we have stopped right there with that word "independence," as though it were the be-all and end-all and do-all. We have not even recognized as we should its inseparable consequence, that, as an independent nation, we have, in Jefferson's own too often forgotten words, "full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States of right do." It will be a blessed good thing for us to get that conception of independence into our heads a good deal more clearly and convincingly than we have hitherto had it.

That, however, is only a part, and perhaps not the major part, of the significance of independence which this Fourth of July, Nineteen Hundred and Eighteen, should bring to us. The other part is what we have already referred to, the reciprocal relationship between power and responsibility, or, to put it more explicitly in the present case, between national independence and national obligation. You cannot separate the two, any more than you can dissolve the sequence of night and day, or have a balance hanging true and level with a weight in only one scale. It was well, it was everlastingly right, to proclaim a hundred and forty-two years ago that we had a right to do all things which independent states may of right do, and we are ready to maintain that right with our last ounce of strength and drop of blood. But it is equally true that we are under obligation to do all things which independent states must of duty do.

That is the everlasting fact which we have been too much ignoring, either thoughtlessly or purposely. Just as surely as we are unwilling to forego our rights, so surely should we be ready to fulfill our duties. From that there is no escape; save through stultification, disaster and shame. It means

that while we require other nations to respect us and to keep their treaties with us, we must equally respect them and keep our treaties with them. It means that we owe a duty to the commonwealth of nations, to bear our part in maintaining, even with force in war, the validity of international law and treaties. It means that if, as we insist, we have a right to declare war and make alliances, we are under obligation to do so whenever it is required by the welfare of the world. That is a conception of America's place among the nations of the world which it will be profitable for us to consider on this Fourth of July.

To be still more specific and direct in the application of the principle: If we had a right to enter into treaties for the safeguarding of neutral rights and for the prohibition of barbarous practises in war, we incurred the equal duty to stand for the enforcement of those treaties. From another angle: If our citizens had a right to travel on the high seas in merchant vessels, our Government had an equal duty to protect them in that right, and to avenge for them its violation. Those are some of the considerations which on this national anniversary abundantly justify our participation in the war; or subject that participation to censure only because it was so long postponed.

There comes, too, a new conception of the rights and duties of the individual citizen, as well as of the nation as a whole. For the union between rights and duties is as strong and as inevitable in the one case as in the other. The President in his felicitous exhortation for the Fourth of July addressed particularly citizens of alien origin. Let us begin with them our application of this principle. If they enjoy the right to become American citizens by naturalization, they bear the equal duty to renounce utterly the old citizenship and to cherish no dual nor divided allegiance. Happily, very few have sought to evade that duty, save a certain proportion of Germans, who come from the only land on earth that has had the insolent effrontery to proclaim and to seek to legitimize dual allegiance—which in its case meant unimpaired allegiance to the old country and a mere hypocritical pretence of it to the country of naturalization. This nation fought a long battle, through many years, to vindicate the right of expatriation, and finally succeeded. It has a right to require in return that its naturalized citizens shall be completely expatriated from the old country, in political sympathy as well

as in technical form. The citizen bears that duty just as much as he enjoys that right.

Another too much forgotten fact of which the Fourth of July may well remind us is this: That political citizenship is not enumerated and is not to be reckoned among the "natural and inalienable rights" which all men enjoy. No man has a right to be a citizen of this country solely because he is a man. He has the right, if at all, because he has complied with certain prescribed requirements, and the nation is indefeasibly competent to prescribe any requirements and conditions that it may please it to do. It is true that our Constitution bestows the *ipso facto* right of citizenship upon all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. But in that very grant it prescribes certain conditions on which alone citizenship may be enjoyed, and that fact implies the power to prescribe any other conditions upon which the necessary majority of the people may be agreed.

Nor is the right or privilege of citizenship, once granted, perpetual and inalienable. It is granted on certain conditions, and it is to be enjoyed only so long as those conditions are complied with. That is elementary logic. Equally obvious is it that it may be revoked for fraud. When it appears that it was originally secured under false pretences, it may be withdrawn. It is to our mind a most salutary circumstance that during the last few months this sound principle, long forgotten or ignored, has been brought to mind by being put into practice. It will be well to have it continually kept in mind by all, native and naturalized. It will give a more just conception of what American citizenship means, and will tend toward a more scrupulous and loyal observance of its duties as well as an exercise of its rights.

"Duties and rights." There is need of further realization of the balance between them so far as the citizen is concerned. He is ready and urgent to assert his rights—his right to vote, his right to freedom of worship and of speech, his right to the protection of the law for his person and property, his right to protection from foreign invasion, his right to the protection of the flag when he goes abroad on the high seas or in foreign lands. "*Civis Americanus sum*" he would make the world's proudest boast of personal security. But when the other side of the shield is presented and there is talk of his duties to the nation, or of the nation's right to com-

mand his service, that is another and very different story. When asked to pay taxes he grumbles. When asked to conserve certain kinds of food he complains of the Government's invasion of his private rights. When asked to volunteer for military service—the identical service which he expects the Government to exercise for his protection—he declines, and when conscripted he shrieks against “tyranny”; while as for universal compulsory military training—what was the Declaration of Independence for if not to free us from such despotism?

Now the fact is, of course, that these things are required of him not in spite of and in violation of but rather because of the Declaration of Independence. The subjects of an autocracy may justly complain of such impositions. The citizens of a democracy should understand that just because they are such citizens these duties to the state are incumbent upon them. Just so surely as the citizen has a right to vote, the state has a right to conscript him for military service. Just so surely as he has a right to the protection of the state, the state has a right to the protection of its citizens. The principle stands foursquare, impregnable and inevitable. And thank God, as a result of this war, men are generally awakening to the fact and the carping, complaining citizen whom we have just described is becoming more and more the despised and detested exception to the rule.

It is gratifying also to observe a growing inclination to assert the right of national self-protection against alien propaganda of all sorts. “The right of self-defense,” said Monroe, in an utterance only a little less memorable than his famous Doctrine, “never ceases. It is among the most sacred, and alike necessary to nations and to individuals.” And in pursuance of that right, he ordered the extreme measure of a military invasion of the territory of another and friendly Power. Assuredly, in vindication of that same right it is legitimate and appropriate to take whatever strenuous measures may be necessary within our own borders. It long seemed safe, in our easy-going tolerance, to permit the existence of a nation-wide alien organization, the confessed purposes of which comprise a cherishing and perpetuation of alien sympathies and affiliations among those who professed to be American citizens. We were boasting of our capacity for receiving and assimilating into thorough American citizenship unlimited numbers of aliens, and at the same time were

countenancing and even encouraging the activities of a vast conspiracy against such assimilation. Just to be aroused out of that folly and to be impelled to apply to political as well as all other life the truth that "no man can serve two masters," will be by no means the least of the benefits which we shall derive from the great war.

"Their first war with England," once said the London *Times* concerning the United States, "made them independent; their second made them formidable." It may be interesting matter of speculation, what comparable effect upon our status will be produced by the present war. We expect that there will be several effects, of the greatest importance. Among them we shall certainly hope to find the awakening to national and individual self-consciousness which we have here indicated; the rising of the nation as a whole to a fuller realization of both the rights and the duties of independence and the indissoluble bond between them, and the similar awakening of individual citizens to a realization of their rights and duties. If this year's commemoration of the nation's natal anniversary shall be marked by such an awakening, it may well rank as the most important since 1776.

"THE THREE YORKTOWN NATIONS"

THE phrase was M. Jusserand's; the epigrammatic climax of a notably eloquent and sympathetic speech: "The three Yorktown nations." It was received, when uttered, with delighted appreciation and applause. It is worthy to be remembered and to be cherished as a part of the mental furniture, or perhaps we should say the mental working tools, of every American citizen. It is peculiarly timely, apt and felicitous at this present conjuncture in the affairs of this nation, of the other two "Yorktown nations," and of the world; when, it is not too much to say, in the hands of those three nations reposes the destiny of the human race.

It will be profitable for us to recall distinctly and accurately what the "three Yorktown nations" meant to each other and to the world at Yorktown, and what they mean at this time, nearly a century and a half later; on both occasions involved in a great war. We may say, then, that the meanings of the two occasions are substantially identical, and that the relationship which existed among the three at Yorktown

in 1781 was the natural forerunner of and prelude to that which exists among the same three nations in 1918. Because they were to each other what they were at Yorktown, they are to each other what they are in Flanders and Picardy and Champagne. That is not a paradox. It is a literal statement of historic fact. And it is so because of the essential identity of purposes and issues of the two wars. In 1781 the three nations were learning the great lesson of democracy, and because they had not yet fully learned it and had not applied its principles, they disagreed and were at war among themselves. In 1918 they have all learned that lesson and therefore are at peace among themselves and are allied together to maintain those principles against a common foe.

We might from one point of view take to ourselves the credit of having been in the Revolution the first to learn the lesson of democracy, and of then having been engaged in teaching it to the others. But that would be a partial and inadequate view. For we must remember, despite the persistent misrepresentations of purblind prejudice, that the Revolution was—as in fact its very name convincingly implies—a Civil War, between two sections or factions of a single nation. It was that just as truly and as essentially as was the civil war in England between Parliament and the Stuart crown, or the later civil war in America between the North and the South. The only difference was in the result. These others ended in reunion of the temporarily distracted and divided nations, while the Revolution ended in a permanent division and separation. The war which culminated at Yorktown was in its inception, so far as England and America were concerned, a struggle of the progressive and democratic part of the British nation against the reactionary and autocratic part; and the later issue, of American secession and independence, which arose in the second year of the war and was finally triumphant, was merely incidental to the original purpose, precisely as the abolition of slavery in our own later civil war was merely incidental to the original purpose, which was to maintain the integrity of the Union.

Nor was that struggle purely sectional, save in the geographical distribution of the actual fighting. A large proportion of the English people in England strongly and openly sided with the American revolutionists; including many of the foremost statesmen and Parliamentarians, and so large a proportion of the army that the Government was

compelled to turn to Germany for mercenary troops to fight its own subjects. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of Americans side, with the reactionists in England. There was, of course, this radical difference, that in England the American sympathizers retained places of power and honor, and finally gained control of the Government and established in England the same reforms that the American revolutionists had demanded and established here, while in America the partisans of the English reactionary faction were ostracised and ultimately exiled. But these, too, or their children, learned the same great lesson of democracy, which has no more staunch and faithful supporters in the world to-day than the descendants of the “Loyalists” and “Tories” of 1781. There is thus nothing more natural or more appropriate than that these two of the Yorktown Nations, America and Great Britain, should to-day be in perfect accord and close alliance. It was not merely the America of Washington and Jefferson that triumphed at Yorktown: it was equally the England of Chatham and Burke.

Nor was there then nor is there now the least false note in the participation of the third of the Yorktown Nations. In the old conflict between France and England, democracy was not involved. That was a conflict between the ancient, autocratic elements of both nations. They had fought each other before, regardless of America, and they would have fought each other again if America had never been brought into the controversy. But a new element entered into the Revolution. That was the rise of the spirit of sympathy with democracy in France, typified by and incarnated in Lafayette; without which we may greatly doubt if France would have given the efficient aid which made Yorktown a scene of triumph. There was no reason why the Bourbon king should have been more sympathetic—rather, less unsympathetic—than Frederick of Prussia or Catherine of Russia. But in Lafayette France had, unconsciously, the forerunner of her own Revolution, her own democracy. It was not because of ancient enmity toward England, but because of love for human freedom and the rights of man, that Lafayette gave his sword and his fortune to America, and thus led France itself into the conflict which set the example for and gave the incitement and inspiration to France’s own revolution and the establishment of the French Republic.

It is thus eminently fitting for France again to form a

member of this trinity of nations. She is the ally of the nation which she assisted to become a sovereign democracy, and which in turn reciprocally assisted her to make her democracy triumphant. She is also the ally of the nation with which she was then at war partly because of ancient issues long since forever passed away, and partly because of at least personal sympathy with the freedom-loving faction of that nation, through the triumph of which all three of the Yorktown Nations have been made the world's chief champions of democracy.

It is a noble consummation that at the conclusion of a hundred years of unbroken peace among them, these three once-warring Powers should be firmly united in an alliance for waging the world's latest and greatest conflict for what we may hope will be the final vindication of the great principles which first brought them together, in so different circumstances, at Yorktown. It is an appropriate commemoration of their century of peace; and for that commemoration, and for its perpetual record, M. Jusserand has provided the most appropriate and significant legend in that pregnant phrase, "the three Yorktown Nations."